
Imagine they will use the most decentralised and permissionless cross-swap provider for BTC swaps @THORChain 👀 @jpthor we need your connections ✊🏼
Maxim_RUNE
201 posts


Imagine they will use the most decentralised and permissionless cross-swap provider for BTC swaps @THORChain 👀 @jpthor we need your connections ✊🏼



THORChain Incident Update #4 Following the events of May 15th, the community has been hard at work defining a path forward. ADR028 is now published and a vote is open for Node Operators. 🔹 The Recovery Plan 🔹 The protocol will absorb the loss first through Protocol-Owned Liquidity and the remainder is spread across synth holders (The exact split between the two is still being evaluated). By doing so, POL will be reduced to zero. The ADR proposes to redirect a portion of system income to replenish it over time. No new RUNE is minted, no RUNE is sold, and no holder is diluted. 🔹 The Technical Decisions 🔹 GG20 is kept in place for now, patched and upgraded. Trading resumes only after the vulnerability is patched and a successful churn has occurred. A slower, more security-conscious release cadence is also called for going forward. 🔹 The Slashing 🔹 Innocent nodes that end up being in the same vault as the attacker are protected. The attacker's node is slashed in full. The recovered RUNE is paired with whatever assets can be recovered from the affected vault, and any surplus RUNE is burned. 🔹 The White Hat Offer 🔹 The attacker is offered a bounty to return the funds. If funds are returned partially, the recovery plan rolls back proportionally. 🔹 Protocol Neutrality 🔹 THORChain remains neutral and permissionless. The attacker's swaps will not be censored once trading resumes. Node Operators are now voting on the overall direction and principles of this proposal. The figures in the ADR are indicative at this stage and will be adjusted later, notably via Mimir. The goal is to restart the network as soon as possible. A yes vote is a green light for developers to continue building in that direction. Full details of ADR028 gitlab.com/-/snippets/599… For those who want to understand the full context of what happened, this article is for you: thorchain.org/blog/thorchain…


After THORChain, now #RetoSwap too. Another attack. Another reminder. Reports say around 7,000 $XMR (~$2.7M) was stolen. Meanwhile the industry still pretends attacks against privacy and decentralized infrastructure are “just coincidence.” They are not. The war against #XMR, privacy and permissionless systems is very real. And let’s not forget the bigger picture: 🚨 Ronin Bridge — ~$625M hacked 🚨 Poly Network — ~$611M hacked 🚨 BNB Bridge — ~$570M hacked 🚨 Wormhole — ~$325M hacked 🚨 Nomad — ~$190M hacked Billions have been lost across crypto infrastructure. That is exactly why THORChain needs to survive. Not only for $RUNE holders, but for the entire industry. Every exploit forces better architecture, stronger security models, better decentralization and more battle-tested systems. The easy path is to quit after attacks. The important path is to evolve and keep building. Privacy, self-custody and decentralized cross-chain liquidity are too important to disappear. And THORChain will help push the solutions forward. 🛡️🔥 #THORChain #RUNE #Monero #XMR







THORChain incident update #1 THORChain contributors shared a new update in the dev discord regarding the ongoing incident. TLDR - Current evidence points toward a newly churned node linked to the attack, likely operated by a single malicious actor - The leading theory is an exploit in the GG20 TSS implementation, allowing vault key material to leak over time. The attacker may have reconstructed the vault private key and executed unauthorized outbound txs - Current network status: -- The network is paused after multiple node operators executed make pause -- RUNE transfers and chain observation may resume within ~12h unless decided otherwise by the nodes. -- Trading, LP actions, signing, and sensitive operations remain paused for now - Recovery discussions currently include slashing affected node bonds, using POL to absorb losses, or other community-driven solutions The investigation is still ongoing alongside THORSec and Outrider Analytics. ## Full Announcement ## Developers and THORSec have been investigating today’s incident continuously throughout the day. While new information may still emerge, I want to provide the community with an update based on what we currently know. The goal of this update is to clarify the current understanding of the situation as accurately and transparently as possible. A newly churned node, thor16ucjv3v695mq283me7esh0wdhajjalengcn84q, which entered the network several days ago, is currently believed to be associated with the attack. Developers have identified links between Ethereum addresses used to acquire and bond RUNE for this node, and Ethereum addresses that later received the stolen funds. Based on current evidence, it is believed this was conducted by a single malicious operator, though the investigation remains ongoing. At this time, the leading theory is the attacker exploited a vulnerability within the GG20 TSS implementation which allowed sensitive key material from vault participants to leak over time. By accumulating enough leaked information, the attacker was ultimately able to reconstruct the vault’s TSS private key and execute unauthorized outbound transactions. The Treasury is actively collecting forensic data and coordinating with Outrider Analytics and relevant law enforcement agencies in an effort to identify the attacker and pursue recovery of stolen funds where possible. Due to multiple node operators executing make pause, the network is currently paused. Unless further action is taken, the pause state will automatically expire in approximately 12 hours. At this time, the development team is comfortable allowing the pause to expire in order to restore RUNE transfers and chain observation activity. However, trading, signing, LP actions, and other sensitive operations will remain paused until the network and community align on a comprehensive recovery and remediation plan. The recovery process will likely require node governance decisions regarding how losses are ultimately handled. Several potential approaches are already being discussed, including: Slashing the bond of nodes participating in the affected vault Allowing Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) to absorb the loss Additional recovery proposals that may emerge from the broader community At this stage, no final decisions have been made. The team is continuing to work on a complete recovery and restart plan for the network. Bringing trading and full functionality back online will likely take several days, and potentially longer depending on the complexity of the chosen remediation path. We will continue to provide updates as more information becomes available. Finally, I want to thank the developers, node operators, security contributors, and the broader THORChain community for the enormous amount of work done today. One of THORChain’s greatest strengths has always been the community’s ability to come together under pressure, collaborate quickly, and solve difficult problems together.

@THORChain I thought it was decentralized???



THORCHADS ✊🏼 thorchain:native could form an inverted H&S with a target of 1.08$ It’s finally time for 1$






Is this how we DeFi? Bruh, too easy I'm already bonding with a great node operator, so I'm comfortable with @THORChain staking mechanics. Unfortunately, bonded capital is locked up. Since I like $RUNE and feel comfortable with it (investing is about understanding and managing risk), what a great opportunity I saw here with $bRUNE I just tried this on @RujiraNetwork as a proof of concept for myself... and it was FUN! Process: 1- I deposited some BTC as collateral 2- borrowed $USDC at 40% loan-to-value 3- got RUNE with the USDC 4- swapped for bRUNE & staked it 5- set rewards to USDC paying out every $2, thanks to @AutoRujira Periodically I'll pay down my loan with the bRUNE returns. Borrowing under 5% interest on a stablecoin while confidently earning 15% + on bRUNE Part of my staked $RUJI also pays out in USDC - those revenues will contribute to paying down the debt too. Eventually, I'll have freed up my collateral and acquired a few thousand RUNE on someone else's money I think I'm winning this time