Max

@Halko500k is normal mate

Hello can someone smart explain to me what does it mean

@izebel_eth @papertrade_xyz @blurr godspeed

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Hantavirus story so far is looking like a dream Plague Inc run start We just need one mf to head over to Mauritius, then we activate Air 1 and we’re cooking

@laserpunkdoteth @0xdoug bro is casually dismissing the rest of the world

@0xdoug Europe has more people than U.S.A majority of devs I know use Anthropic directly or indirectly.

I’m really struggling to see how the back of the envelope math on this works out… There are generously 4 million characterized “software workers” in America. That’s pretty broad and includes a lot of people who aren’t really classical engineers don’t produce that much code. That comes out to nearly $1k per month of average Claude spend across every dev in America. Yes, there’s some international usage, but it can’t be that much. Yes there is some non software Cowork usage, but that doesn’t use that many tokens. Yes, some non engineers are using Claude to vibe code, but I really doubt many are spending hundreds per month on. Even if we assume 50% of all software workers are using Claude, that comes out to $2k spend per month per Claude user. Thats 10X more than the highest tier Max subscription. So almost all of Anthropics revenue has to be API billing So the only explanation is that something like 20%+ of software engineers are not only Claude users but on API billing and regularly spending thousands per month. At $5/m Opus tokens that means the average API user has to be going through something like 25 million tokens per day. *OR* the other possibility is API revenue is heavily power law dominated. Maybe there’s just something like 100k super users who are making up the majority of the revenue. For that to work the typical super user would have to be spending on the order of $50k/month and guzzling nearly 1 billion tokens per day.

@Fiskantes first generation of cryptobros are already pushing forty won’t be long now

Maybe we just need doxxed old men in suits who are really afraid of going to prison in charge of DeFi Maybe thats not such a bad model after all 🤔

@cryptographicas @binji_x they've deposited eth into aave not so long ago

@binji_x Is the EF involved in anyway or just cheering from the sidelines?

The only failure of the DeFi United initiative would be if it stops after the bailout. This is a coordination feat that can set the tone for many more efforts dedicated to ecosystem resilience. Hoping to see DeFi United both today and every day after. Massive kudos.

@dinosaurteef @DefiIgnas how dare you call me negligent? all i did was liquid stake my eth, then restake my liquid staked eth, and then loop it 10x after i saw a 'just use aave' ad.

@DefiIgnas Kelp - pointless grift Eigen - pointless grift Unichain - pointless grift Zero - negligent Aave - negligent Users - negligent root cause: pointless grifts evangelized by EF Vitalik and Bankless Bros should fill the holes they dug…

Boggles my mind that L0 blames Kelp for this hack when their own LayerZero Labs DVN, RPC infra, etc. was spoofed into forging a fake message. Dune reports that 47% of LayerZero OApps’ DVNs run a 1-of-1 DVN security floor. The other 45% run 2-of-2. So Kelp isn't an outlier here but most apps used 1 DVN. Maybe I'm missing something here?

@safetyth1rd otoh, build the perfect bridge and get no traction because decentralisation is expensive and the market doesn't care. a case of: do you want to be right or do you want to make money

If you actually look at the record There’s multiple researchers and teams calling out layer zeros poor security practices over years Each of which gets drowned out by Bryan pellegrino and team gaslighting plus prominent investors who overlook their issues

@witcheer so adjusted for economic relevance less than 1% used 1-1

forked Dune's LayerZero DVN analysis after the KelpDAO hack. wanted to know how many OApps still run configs structurally identical to what got drained. of ~3,500 OApps deployments on LayerZero v2 in the last 90 days: - 1,111 run a strict, consistent 1-of-1 DVN (every message, no optional backstop) - 28 of those bridged >$100k - 10 bridged >$1m open query, forked from Dune's. methodology notes in the dashboard. lower bound, coverage limited to V2 ULN302. dune.com/witcheer/layer…

you can build beautiful protocols that adhere to the ethos we’re all here for, but get no traction because they get smashed on the rocks of economics. or take a step back and allow deployers to cut corners and hope they'll move up the spectrum of decentralisation once it becomes economically feasible

@_0xmax @Dune i see where youre coming from but any precedent of this sort for teams to opt into is bad precedent, just get rid of 1/1 entirely. any ceded ground is lost ground, and it is blind optimism to assume people will switch to more secure setups later.

Following the KelpDAO hack, we built an open analysis of DVN security configurations across every active OApp on LayerZero over the last 90 days. Of ~2,665 unique OApp contracts: 47% run a 1-of-1 DVN security floor, 45% run 2-of-2, and ~5% run 3-of-3 or higher. As we know, KelpDAO's rsETH sat in the first bucket. Open query, public methodology, feedback welcome: dune.com/dune/layerzero…

@JoelKatz @josefabregab @aave from a marketing/pr perspective, yes from an accounting perspective, no

@josefabregab @aave "Users are explicitly taking on additional counterparty risk when using LayerZero’s bridge." This is incorrect. Every holder assumed the risks associated with the bridge because holders of the bridged tokens have precisely the same claim on the shared pool of collateral.

Unpopular opinion: rsETH L2 users should bear the loss. Users are explicitly taking on additional counterparty risk when using LayerZero’s bridge. Ethereum rsETH holders didn’t take that risk and shouldn’t bear the consequences. Let alone @aave wETH depositors.

@0xngmi considering most of ct was throwing l2's under the bus yesterday, this is not an 'if' how the tables have turned

checked the numbers and if arbitrum spends the seized money giving priority to arbitrum's aave market: - in case of socialization of losses -> no bad debt at all on arb - in case of rsETH on L2s getting rugged -> aave on arbitrum reduces bad debt by 80% ($88M to $17M)

@BrainsyEth @Dune 1 of 1

@_0xmax @Dune is the answer greater than 1?

@ChainLinkGod wouldn’t competitor hit pieces fall under ‘psyops’ too?

@_0xmax It reflects a pattern of behavior of deception, similar to how the term “Decentralized Verifier Network” is a marketing psyops lie

A reminder that, according to the FTX estate’s allegations, LayerZero used its knowledge of Alameda’s financial distress as leverage in a deal involving forgiveness of Alameda’s $45M loan LayerZero then, according to Ellison’s testimony, sent a later agreement with a price change she says she did not notice at the time, which she later called deceptive Ellison’s deposition: “I was concerned that LayerZero would make public statements about Alameda’s insolvency and this could cause our fraud to come to light.”

@DefiIgnas now graduated to maximum entropy advisors

Kelp hack could leave Aave on Arbitrum with bad debt and make rsETH worthless if only mainnet rsETH is backed. But the Arbitrum DAO was quick enough to withdraw its assets from Aave after the hack. They had $10M in ETH and ~$5M in stables on Aave, earning yield via the Treasury Management Program. Managed by Entropy Advisors, they quickly withdrew everything. Interestingly, they also withdrew stables from Spark and now only hold some on Morpho, with the other half currently unallocated.

@ieaturfoods unironically now is the safest time to use it

Layerzero OFT standard is too critical for distro reach and value creation for all the protocols/issuers that use it to forfeit that instead of working with the team to make sure this type of incident can’t happen again Unironically, L0 is the most unscathed from the hack

i get it from the perspective of lz and aave: bailouts for the impacted users ultimately means zero/aave tokenholders take the hit. bailouts = wrong precedent/perverse incentive besides that, why would they take the hit for kelp? its over for them anyway. from a reputational perspective a bailout would only +ev when the market didn't have collective memory of a goldfish.

@_0xmax Everyone is going to start pointing fingers at each other. Without thinking about the users impacted. Imagine my surprise.

@ImperiumPaper btw, we won't see a world where assets are junior/senior depending on which chain they reside for the same reason our beloved lending market isnt siloed.

@ImperiumPaper in case of rseth -purely from an accounting perspective- their lock & mint/burn model means holders of the wrapper should take the hit. in reality we will probably see socialized losses because the above was never advertised (that i know of).

rsETH poses an interesting question. rsETH is minted on mainnet. All other chains hold let’s call it rsETH’ - a derivative of the rsETH held in the bridge escrow. Are these actually separate products? The argument is that rsETH’ users took on bridge risk, while rsETH users never agreed to. The argument against is that rsETH’ was never presented as a different product, or indicated that it could experience losses without rsETH doing so as well. When I due diligence for RWAs, understanding where you stand in line for repayment is one of the first questions you ask. I think many folks kind of forget about that with onchain assets. Even something as simple as a fully onchain asset inside a Morpho vault comes down to what version the vault is. I think this laxness is due to the prevalence of binary outcomes in crypto assets - it’s dead or it isn’t - so there’s historically not much of a residual to fight over for recovery. So in many ways this is growing pains of a crypto that is becoming a little safer - the asset didn’t go to zero, or even to 50% losses. These are losses that are potentially sustainable, but only if owners and lenders begin to price not just likelihood of impairment, but what the expected recovery is. Anyway, that’s your silver lining: we are beginning to see impaired assets recently with substantial recovery, which adds a new leg to risk management.