Pete Patterson

161 posts

Pete Patterson

Pete Patterson

@ppatterson85

Cincinnati, OH Katılım Temmuz 2010
155 Takip Edilen531 Takipçiler
Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
@KannonShanmugam Love it. I’ll be there in about a week. Is this the little church by the cathedral downtown?
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Kannon Shanmugam
Kannon Shanmugam@KannonShanmugam·
Good afternoon from Athens — one of my favorite cities in the world.
Kannon Shanmugam tweet media
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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
A lingering thought on the birthright citizenship argument: there was much discussion about practical complications with a domicile requirement. But I believe there is general agreement that domicile is required for state citizenship under the clause. So, regardless of how the clause is interpreted for national citizenship, any practical complications relating to domicile will still be present for determining state citizenship. And that would seem to defeat any inference that the text should be intepreted to avoid those complications, as the framers and ratifiers were not intent on avoiding them.
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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
@MorosKostas It is remarkable that the argument appears to be that there a handful of frozen-in-time exceptions without a consistent principle unifying them and without a clear tie to the constitutional language.
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Kostas Moros
Kostas Moros@MorosKostas·
There's no solid reason to think it was meant to be strictly limited to these three categories because if it were, why not just list them instead of using the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction".
Eric W.@EWess92

Trump v. Barbara: Birthright Citizenship argument. Listening, what stood out to me, was the ACLU Attorney's argument tension. She argued (1) the three exceptions (diplomats, invaders, Indians) are a closed, unchangeable set but also (2) could not answer where those came from

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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
Re-upping my SCOTUSblog pieces on birthright citizenship, which address many of the key questions asked during today's argument, including the import of the English common law, the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 relative to the Citizenship Clause, and the status of Native American tribe members born off of tribal land. Links below.
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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
Very nice win today for our clients and the people of North Carolina in the voter ID case before Judge Biggs of the Middle District of North Carolina. This one is especially gratifying given that we fought all the way up to the United States Supreme Court to establish the right of our clients, leaders of the North Carolina legislature, to intervene in the case to defend the law.
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Howard Sklar
Howard Sklar@HowardMSklar·
Definitely a government burden to show that a weapon isn't ICUFLP. Because it's a step-2 problem. It's just that when a weapon is ICU, SCOTUS has done the analysis and there's no historical tradition of bans. Court rulings putting it in step 1 are plain error. I like the idea that widely legal = ICUFLP. The definition should be multi-variant: 1. sheer numbers can get you there 2. Widely legal (without hue and cry) 3. Bought by some, but not used widely by criminals
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85

The way we have been arguing this is that what the government needs to show is that something is not a common arm; i.e., the American people have decided that it is a dangerous and unusual arm that can be reserved for special and not common use. Although not 2A cases, Staples and Smith & Wesson are helpful in that they both were attempting to draw a line between common and unusual arms. Staples used terms like "commonplace," "generally available," and "traditionally lawful" to describe common arms. And Smith & Wesson used terms like "widely legal" and "bought by many ordinary customers." This also tracks with Alito's concurrence in Caetano and Kavanaugh's statement respecting denial in Snope, which both looked at common ownership and general legality. Under this approach, above a certain number (say, in the millions), it becomes impossible to say that something is dangerous and unusual. But even at lower numbers, it is simply impossible to say that the American people consider something dangerous and unusual if as a general matter they sit idly by while the items remain freely available on the market.

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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
The way we have been arguing this is that what the government needs to show is that something is not a common arm; i.e., the American people have decided that it is a dangerous and unusual arm that can be reserved for special and not common use. Although not 2A cases, Staples and Smith & Wesson are helpful in that they both were attempting to draw a line between common and unusual arms. Staples used terms like "commonplace," "generally available," and "traditionally lawful" to describe common arms. And Smith & Wesson used terms like "widely legal" and "bought by many ordinary customers." This also tracks with Alito's concurrence in Caetano and Kavanaugh's statement respecting denial in Snope, which both looked at common ownership and general legality. Under this approach, above a certain number (say, in the millions), it becomes impossible to say that something is dangerous and unusual. But even at lower numbers, it is simply impossible to say that the American people consider something dangerous and unusual if as a general matter they sit idly by while the items remain freely available on the market.
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Howard Sklar
Howard Sklar@HowardMSklar·
Howard Sklar@HowardMSklar

Has anyone on our side actually proposed a definition of "commonly used?" I don't remember seeing one. We've said ARs are common, but not specifically what our definition of that word is, beyond "more sales than the Ford F-150." I've also never seen an argument made that ARs are commonly used for competition, but that's true. We've asked what "use" means, and we've asked what "common" means in terms of sheer numbers, but I wonder what the right denominator is for "common." Is it common among gun owners? Common among the general populace? Because few gun owners compete, as a percentage. But for those that do, a bunch use ARs. And that's a lawful purpose. And as I've asked before, a different issue with "common" is how specific we get. If you go really general, rifles are common. Since the AR is a rifle, is that good enough? But we look at ARs differently from lever-action or bolt action, right? So the category is "semi-auto rifles." But that puts "semi-auto pistols" into a different category too, right? But we'd say that a semi-auto pistol has the same protections as a revolver, yes? And don't get me started on "use." Which to the anti-gunners means "firing," even though that's completely wrong. Sticking with "common." I think the answer is based on sales. 1. Something can be common because it's obvious that the People have chosen it, proven by the sheer numbers of sales. The AR is the paradigmatic example. 2. Something can be common because of the speed of adoption. Not necessarily how many, but how many as a function of how fast. The numerator can be lower, if the time factor is shorter. What's important to remember is that common use for lawful purposes is a STEP 2 requirement. Too many courts have mistakenly said only commonly used weapons are even under the 2A. That's plain error. Uncommon weapons that aren't unusually dangerous can still be protected if there's no historical basis for regulation. .22 single-shots are uncommon. Muskets are uncommon today. But obviously protected.

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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
In addition to Gardner, I would like to highlight another case we have pending before SCOTUS on cert. The case challenges George Peterson's conviction for possessing an unregistered suppressor in his home. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning upholding the conviction would allow the government to require the registration of all firearms. From the intro: There is no historical practice of firearm regulation that could justify a registration scheme allowing the government to systematically track who in the community owns arms. Indeed, in the leadup to the Revolution, the British “Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008), and the Second Amendment was understood to prevent any similar “flagitous attempt” by the government of this Nation to “disarm the people,” id. at 607 (quoting WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 121–22 (1825)). Against this backdrop, it cannot seriously be maintained that in declaring that “the right to keep and bear arms . . . shall not be infringed,” the Framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights understood the Government to be authorized to maintain a registry that would facilitate the very infringements that the Second Amendment was meant to prohibit. Yet that is what the Fifth Circuit held in this case, albeit only by misconstruing the National Firearms Act’s taxation-and-registration regime as a shall-issue-licensing law. Petitioner George Peterson was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison for possessing a firearm suppressor in a safe in his bedroom closet.
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Pete Patterson
Pete Patterson@ppatterson85·
I am pleased to be representing Eva Gardner before the United States Supreme Court along with my colleague John Ohlendorf. Here is an excerpt from the intro to the reply brief we have filed in support of the Court taking the case: While Petitioner was traveling through Maryland from her home in Virginia to visit her mother in Pennsylvania, she was forced off the road by what she believed was a police-type maneuver. When the other driver got out of his car and approached Petitioner in a way she perceived as threatening, she “was terrified” and responded by engaging in a common, effective, and non-lethal self-defense measure: simply displaying the firearm that she was licensed by Virginia to carry and that she had brought with her on her journey for self-protection. It is difficult to imagine conduct that falls more squarely within both the Second Amendment’s “plain text” and America’s tradition of legitimate “armed self-defense.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24, 29 (2022). Yet Maryland responded to this incident by convicting Petitioner—not for behaving inappropriately in any way during the encounter, but solely for bringing her firearm with her for her protection as she traveled along Maryland’s interstate highways.
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