Night King

Some insights on Iran’s situational assessment nearly a month into the campaign: A. Iran is interested in a ceasefire. However, from its perspective, there is a worse scenario than a ceasefire, namely, a temporary ceasefire. Following the 12-day war in June, senior Iranian officials and commentators warned that it would only be a temporary ceasefire and that the U.S. and/or Israel would resume attacking Iran in the near future. Tehran is not prepared for endless cycles of war and therefore insists on ending the current campaign with guarantees that no further attacks will occur. B. Surrender has never been part of the Islamic Republic’s lexicon and is not on the table even a month after the outbreak of the war. Regardless of the Iranian leadership’s current assessment of its situation, it is not willing to concede to American demands. This is also tied to the identity of Iran’s current leadership, which is largely composed of veterans of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose formative experience is the Iran–Iraq War. Iran’s leaders belong to hardline circles that not only viewed the 8-year war as a national trauma shaping their strategic outlook, but also adopted the revisionist narrative of a “stab in the back,” according to which Khomeini was forced to “drink the poison chalice” after being betrayed and misled by politicians led by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who compelled him to accept a ceasefire with Iraq. Will the new leadership in Tehran nevertheless be willing to make certain compromises that Iran rejected prior to the war? Possibly. Will it eventually conclude that it cannot bear the costs of the war and become willing to make even more far-reaching concessions? Perhaps. But for now, this is clearly not on the agenda. C. To this should be added Tehran’s current assessment, which is based on several assumptions: 1) They believe that, after the initial blow they suffered in the early days of the war, they have managed to adapt to the situation. 2) They assess that there is currently no significant threat to regime stability. The growing number of reports citing intelligence assessments and leadership circles in Washington and Jerusalem that the war will not lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime, alongside the adjustments made by security forces to attacks on IRGC bases, Basij headquarters, and internal security forces, reinforce this assessment in Tehran. 3) Tehran has adopted a “mindset of achievement” (and perhaps even a sense of victory), based on the belief that not only will the Islamic Republic survive the war, but that it can leverage its asymmetric capabilities—foremost among them the (partial) closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on critical infrastructure in Gulf states—as a strategic leverage. This could enable Iran not only to return to the pre-war status quo but also to establish a new regional architecture based on recognition of its sovereignty over the strait, and possibly even the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, taking into account Iran’s regional standing and its capacity to inflict damage on the global economy. 4) In Tehran’s assessment, the two main escalatory options available to the U.S. are strikes on Iran’s energy and electricity infrastructure, and a ground operation to seize control of the strait or one of the islands (Khark or Abu Musa). Iran does not ignore this possibility, but believes that its own escalation could at the very least disrupt American plans. In the event of strikes on Iranian infrastructure, Iran has the capacity to retaliate in ways that would severely damage critical infrastructure across the region. In the case of a ground operation (even if successful), it is doubtful that it would allow for the immediate reopening of the strait. Seizing Khark Island would expose U.S. forces to Iranian fire, and it is uncertain whether the high economic cost to Iran would translate into immediate Iranian concessions, as Tehran may be able to absorb the economic consequences for weeks or even months while continuing to impose high costs on U.S. forces, regional states, and the global economy. Even a successful operation in the strait itself would not necessarily prevent Iran from continuing to threaten tanker traffic, for example, by drones, and this alone provides a level of deterrence that could prevent the resumption of activity in the strait even in the event of a successful U.S. military operation. In sum, Iran is open to diplomacy, negotiations, and possibly even significant compromises—but without relinquishing minimum demands, including guarantees against the resumption of hostilities, sanctions relief (which could be framed as reparations), and the preservation of certain nuclear capabilities, especially missile capabilities. If an agreement with the U.S. cannot be reached based on Iran’s position, Tehran is prepared to continue a prolonged war of attrition, based on its assessment that its resilience and stamina are greater than those of the U.S. and its regional allies. In any case, from Tehran’s perspective, the cost of total capitulation remains far higher than the risks of continuing the war.

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