Jacob Michelson🪬

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Jacob Michelson🪬

Jacob Michelson🪬

@JacobCMichelson

Ph.D. from @KingsMiddleEast. Researching Muslim youth and their identity formations in Western contexts. Tweeting about issues facing the wider Muslim World.

London - Sydney - Wisconsin Katılım Kasım 2013
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Aaron Y. Zelin
Aaron Y. Zelin@azelin·
Man the historical illiteracy on this site is stupendous. People that think this has to do with the Iran war really know nothing. This goes back to the U.S. commitment/deal with Iraq from 2024 to withdraw after the fight against IS was over. Whether the U.S. is repeating history like 2010 is another story, but this is tied to the Global Coalition Against IS, not the current Iran war. Just like the U.S. completion of withdrawing from Syria in April.
Joyce Karam@Joyce_Karam

⚡️SCOOP: US is withdrawing its last remaining forces from Erbil #Iraq. Patriot systems have already been removed. Details from @amberinzaman al-monitor.com/originals/2026…

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Kamran Bokhari
Kamran Bokhari@KamranBokhari·
➤ The next front in the U.S.-Iran conflict may be the Caspian. The war is expanding along Iran's northern flank, where the Ukraine conflict, South Caucasus realignment, and the U.S.-Iran war are beginning to converge. ➤ Washington's pressure on Hormuz has made the Caspian strategically indispensable for Tehran. As southern routes become contested, Iran increasingly depends on northern trade and military corridors linking it to Russia. ➤ Ukraine's strike on an Iranian cargo vessel in the Caspian wasn't just an isolated incident - it exposed how Europe's war and the Middle East conflict are becoming interconnected. From Tehran's perspective, the risk of a second front is no longer theoretical. ➤ Iran's greatest strategic vulnerability isn't only in the Gulf - it's in the northwest. Roughly a quarter of Iran's 93 million people are ethnic Azeris, while Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and the U.S. have all expanded their influence across the South Caucasus. ➤ The erosion of Russian power matters as much as U.S. pressure. Moscow once buffered Iran's northern frontier, but the Ukraine war has weakened Russia's ability to contain competing powers in the Caucasus and Central Asia. ➤ Israel has already demonstrated the Caspian is no sanctuary. Its strike on Bandar Anzali underscored that Iran's northern logistics and arms routes are now within reach, raising the costs of any prolonged regional war. ➤ The key strategic question isn't whether Tehran can fight on multiple fronts - it can't - it's whether it can prevent one from opening in the north while simultaneously escalating across the Arab world.. ➤ Bottom line: The Caspian is no longer a geopolitical backwater. It is rapidly emerging as the strategic bridge where the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East could merge - reshaping the Eurasian balance of power My latest essay: geopoliticalfutures.com/the-risks-of-c…
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Nadav Pollak
Nadav Pollak@NadavPollak·
Very important analysis by @amirtibon on the new announcement by President Trump regarding the disarmament of Hamas
Amir Tibon אמיר תיבון@amirtibon

Some thoughts on the Gaza agreement announced overnight, which despite my reservations and concerns, I hope will be implemented. 1. Donald Trump is trying to collect "wins" and "achievements" ahead of the midterm elections. His party is entering that election at a disadvantage, but because Democrats may choose weak and unpopular candidates in specific states, much like Republicans did in 2022, there's a reason for Trump to at least try achieving a surprising result like the one Biden secured four years ago. 2. The will to provide Trump such a "win" was an important motivation for all sides involved in this agreement: Hamas, Netanyahu, Qatar, Egypt, UAE and Turkey. All of them hope, each for their own reasons, that the transactional president will remember their role in the agreement and the positive media coverage it has generated and will continue to generate. You can like it or not, but that's the nature of diplomacy, especially in the Middle East, under Trump. 3. Netanyahu and his band of liars in the Israeli media (and the last few suckers in the American media still buying his spin) are already trying to oversell the agreement and present it in terms that contradict the Board of Peace statements and briefings. Of course, the October 7 Prime Minister can't just say the truth on this one, which goes something like: "I'm trying to stay on good terms with Trump ahead of an election here in Israel that will determine my personal fate and whether or not I go to jail in 2027." 4. For Hamas, the agreement is a way to buy time and survive, which is basically the organization's overarching goal since October 7. They lost most of their leadership and thousands of their fighters; they will also, I believe, give up some of their weapons to the new Gaza-based Palestinian government, which is a good thing. But at the bottom of all their decisions is a simple calculation: being able to say, "we committed the most deadly and humiliating attack against Israel since the start of the conflict, and survived as a movement and an organization to tell about it." 5. Hamas was able to say that yesterday, before the agreement was signed, and it can also say that today, after the conclusion of the negotiations. So in that regard, the agreement is preferable to the murky post-war reality that preceded it, in which Hamas was recruiting again thousands of young fighters, holding on to all its weapons, and controlling 99% of Gaza's population, making money off people buying fuel and cigarettes. Changing even a part of that terrible reality, by collecting some of the weapons and allowing progress on reconstruction under a non-Hamas government, is better. It means coming to terms with the fact that Israel under this government failed to dismantle Hamas and allowed its survival even before this agreement was signed. 6. Do I think the agreement will be fully implemented over the next 300 days, as I understand the timeline? (Correct me if I'm wrong on the time period, @lizarozovsky - BTW, everyone should follow Liza, diplomatic reporter for @haaretzcom who has been covering this story for months while many journalists ditched it once the Iran war started.) I'm highly skeptical. But I'm also asking: what are the alternatives? Netanyahu, in his quest for political survival at all costs, ignored David Ben-Gurion's national security strategy of seeking short and decisive wars, which was based on Israel's unique internal and external challenges that make it dangerous for this country to have long wars of attrition. The result is an Israel that is hated, isolated and denounced around the world like never before, and is totally reliant on the support of one man (TRUMP) to avoid crushing international sanctions. Going to war in Gaza once again based on the same promise of "finishing Hamas," which this government failed to achieve after three long years, would have been suicidal unless Trump promised his full backing. And Trump, for good reasons, can't give such a commitment after his bitter experience with Netanyahu in Iran and Lebanon. 7. For me and my family, these are all very personal, not only political, questions. My six-year-old daughter will start school on the Gaza border in exactly one month, as we rebuild our life in the same home where Hamas tried to murder us on October 7. We've learned over the years to be highly skeptical of premature victory announcements and diplomatic celebrations. When these things collapse under the cynical realities of the conflict, most of those announcing them are not around to face the consequences. Still, I don't see a better alternative to the 20-Point Plan that Trump presented last year, at least not with Israel's current position of isolation and exhaustion under this government. So I have some hope that the agreement will succeed, even partially, and deliver a period of quiet. For us on the border, that would be significant after three years of war and trauma. And maybe in the long run, with different Israeli and Palestinian leadership, this will become a first step in a broader positive change for the region.

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Jonathan Lemire
Jonathan Lemire@JonLemire·
“Within months of his taking office, the Pentagon had slashed the number of total staff working to prevent and investigate civilian-casualty incidents by about 90 percent. “Hegseth brought the same gloves-off mentality to the war in Iran” theatlantic.com/national-secur…
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Steven A. Cook
Steven A. Cook@stevenacook·
I can get behind this. Of the signatories, the Egyptians, Turks, and Pakistanis have significant navies. Will they fight the Houthis, though? Saudi Arabia announces maritime defence alliance to secure vital waterways aje.news/kn08lg via @AJEnglish
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Celine Kasem
Celine Kasem@celinekasem·
🧵First major rap entertainment show in Damascus since liberation. This will probably bring criticism from people saying we’re living in “my Syria” or being hypocritical. Ironically, I used to be one of the biggest critics of the whole “my Syria” narrative.
Celine Kasem tweet mediaCeline Kasem tweet media
Celine Kasem tweet media
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Peter R. Neumann
Peter R. Neumann@PeterRNeumann·
1/ Ich habe mir die aktuelle Berichterstattung in den spanischen Medien zu Ceuta mal genauer angeschaut. Mein Fazit: Die Lage ist ernst, aber deutlich komplexer, als viele Darstellungen in den sozialen Medien vermuten lassen.
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Jacob Michelson🪬
Jacob Michelson🪬@JacobCMichelson·
Australians Kawsar Ahmad, 54, and Zeinab Ahmad, 31, who returned to Melbourne in May after spending years detained in a Syrian camp, have pleaded not guilty to slavery charges stemming from allegations related to their time living under Islamic State rule abc.net.au/news/2026-07-3…
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The Soufan Center
The Soufan Center@TheSoufanCenter·
#IntelBrief: ISKP has been at the forefront of terrorist groups experimenting with artificial intelligence, even becoming the first Islamic State branch to offer guidance on the technology to Islamic State followers and supporters. Read more 👇 thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-202…
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Itai Sher
Itai Sher@itaisher·
A prominent complaint on universities is that they’ve been politicized So what does the professional association of professors do? It makes the first political endorsement in its 110 year history, wading into a factional fight in a Democratic primary @aaup needs new leadership
Todd Wolfson@ProfTWolf

Today, @AAUP is proud to endorse @AbdulElSayed for Michigan's next US Senator. This is the first endorsement in our 110 year history. Abdul understands the crisis in higher education and how we can build for what comes next! #College4All insidehighered.com/news/governmen…

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Jacob Ware
Jacob Ware@Jacob_A_Ware·
"Dutch police detained ​three teenagers ‌overnight as part of a ​terrorism investigation." Another gravely concerning youth radicalization case from Europe. 🇳🇱 (h/t @ClaraBroekaert) reuters.com/world/three-te…
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Richard Ferrer
Richard Ferrer@richferrer·
Haifa has Israel's largest Arab Christian community and more than 20,000 Arab Muslim residents. It is the world centre of the Baháʼí faith and home to @TechnionLive, a world-leading university where 30% of students are young Arabs being trained to become the next generation of scientists and engineers. Its graduates invented the USB flash drive, the PillCam and modern drip irrigation. Haifa is precisely the tolerant, multicultural success story the fanatically obtuse @TheGreenParty claims to celebrate. Haifa ticks every progressive box. The only problem is it's in Israel. @hackneycouncil @zoegarbettgreen
Jewish News@JewishNewsUK

Fierce backlash as Green-led Hackney Council votes to begin ending Haifa twinning jewishnews.co.uk/fierce-backlas…

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Paweł Wójcik 🦋
Paweł Wójcik 🦋@SaladinAlDronni·
Given what is happening in Ceuta and Melilla, we @LucasADWebber also have a section in our long analysis for Hudson on the danger of "migrants" crossing, and how terror groups including Islamic State are present there and lately tried to attack Spain itself. Do give a read.
Paweł Wójcik 🦋@SaladinAlDronni

A bit late 🧵. So, when looking at the Sahel, one cannot help but spot the behemoth that is JNIM, arguably the most powerful al-Qaeda affiliate atm. I personally think they are very short distance from cousin in Somalia. However, it’s Islamic State being an elephant in the room.

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Mina Al-Lami
Mina Al-Lami@Minalami·
IS has published the latest issue of its weekly newspaper, al-Naba, without any mention of the #BerlinPrideAttack attack. Its supporters online have also become far less vocal about the incident. If IS intends to associate itself with the attack or the attacker, including by claiming to have inspired the act through its messaging, such a statement would not necessarily come immediately. In 2024 and 2025, the group said it would no longer rush to claim every attack and, in some cases, would not claim involvement even where it had played a role. This approach was reflected in the New Orleans and Bondi Beach attacks last year. In both cases, IS commented on the incidents in the editorials of al-Naba, rather than issuing a separate statement or formal claim. It did not claim direct responsibility, instead presenting the attacks as having been inspired by its propaganda. Following the New Orleans attack on 1 Jan 2025, IS commented on the incident in al-Naba on 9 Jan - eight days later - in the second issue published after the attack, rather than the first. Following the Bondi Beach attack on 14 Dec 2025, IS addressed the incident in al-Naba on 18 Dec, four days later, in the first issue published after the attack.
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