Charlie B

The state of the discourse, as reported in the news, it's as if no one knows what mechanisms have been established and practiced for years over there for this exact situation. It's as if hundreds of official meetings, conferences and exercises and thousands of press releases about these event, never happened. I don't get it.

If only there was two separate coalition forces created in 2019 called International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel Hormuz Escort Coalition and European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) Operation Agénor.

D+20 No change.

Finally! The 2024 INSURV report has been published. Note it is dated 1 MAR 2025, the date it was due per Title 10 US Code §8674. But only published OVER one year and two weeks later. Just think how hard the fleet has been worked since the data from this report was collected. insurv.usff.navy.mil/Organization/A… @mercoglianos @cdrsalamander @johnkonrad @brentdsadler @Lazarus_Navy @maloryshel

Interesting to see the media in Singapore (@ChannelNewsAsia) report the transit of the USS TRIPOLI in the Singapore Strait. channelnewsasia.com/shorts/us-navy… Also International Media, CNN: (@isaacyeephoto): cnn.com/2026/03/17/mid… I'm reminded of the USS TARAWA Amphibious Ready Group, deployment in 2002/2003 to Iraq, with the embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, which briefly stopped in Singapore for logistics and a final bit of R&R, prior to deploying to the Persian Gulf for combat operations in Iraq. I met up one of my buddies from college who was a young Marine Corps officer on his way to do battle in Iraq, ultimately in Fallujah. +20 years later, watching another ARG sail past Sibgapore, this time without stopping, on way to the Persian Gulf, for possible combat operations, this time in Iran. Make you think. Fair winds and following seas to the sailors and marines onboard. May you be guarded in danger, steady in duty, and returned home in peace. @zachiscol

Update: ☘️ 17 MAR 2026 (after Happy Hour) Just another day in the Singapore Strait #ShipSpotting (📷shared by a friend) Nice perspective on how busy this maritime chokepoint is, every day. Fair winds and following seas for the rest of your voyage. @mercoglianos @TankerTrackers @StraitsSights @sgshipspotting @Dr_Sacheverell @sanggam_sihite @WarshipCam

Update: One Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) is visible in port Penang, in this #Sentinel2 🛰️📷 from 16 MAR 2026. Yesterday, two LCS were spotted in those great 📷by shipspotter IG/aerokessler and shared by @TheBaseLeg See @DzirhanDefence article at @USNI for some interesting details on this unusual ship visit: news.usni.org/2026/03/16/mid… Perhaps one LCS left port after finding out that it is not Durian season right now.

Yesterday I was trying to make sense of what was transiting through Hormuz and redrew my polygon beyond the narrow international channel normally used for transits to take in wider waters. And that's how I saw what I believe is a new trend that has emerged in the past 3-4 days: ships that are rerouting via Iran's territorial waters to exit the Strait. In one of the first signs of a workaround and permission-based transits to friendly countries, at least five bulk carriers were tracked sailing eastbound to exit the Middle East Gulf through Iranian waters over the past 48 hours. You can see from the navigation chart below the trajectory which is well outside of the actual channel (shown in purple). The new route illustrates how Iran’s selective blockade has evolved to allow allies and supporters to transit. In addition to bulk carriers, two liquefied petroleum gas carriers have sailed through in the past 36 hours.  (These of course are ships with their AIS switched on, there's also Iranian-linked tankers going through dark). In nearly all cases the bulk carriers previously called at Imam Khomeini port in Iran, one of the Islamic Republic’s key commercial ports. Many had Chinese links. Eight ships, excluding Iranian flagged vessels, were tracked through the strait with their AIS on March 16, nearly double numbers seen earlier this week. So here's a working theory: there's no verified evidence (yet) that Iran has laid mines in the Strait of Hormuz but the threat is there, and along with the fear of attack, that channel is effectively closed. So how to control of the Strait? Allow 'friendly' vessels to exit and enter via your territorial waters, with a route that hugs the Iranian coastline to avoid the usual international navigation route which may or may not be mined. Western-affiliated vessels won't voluntarily come into Iranian waters, but likely Chinese, Indian and others will. find out more in our blog post here: windward.ai/blog/bulk-carr…

See the @UANI #GhostArmada list of illicit tankers that enable Iranian oil trade, profits of which go to the IRGC and the regime's regional and domestic terror: unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/stop-hop-…

Business as usual at Kharg Island 🇮🇷 The 🇮🇷oil loaded here onto 🇮🇷-flagged and falsely-flagged (stateless) vessels. These tankers will brazenly sail out of the Persian Gulf using the territorial waters of Iran, rather than the international sea lanes that are effectively blocked by the RISK of further attacks by Iran on neutral ships and seafarers. These tankers will sail via the Indian Ocean to the Malacca Strait, where they will openly sail with AIS on, throught he Singapore Strait, to the Eastern Out of Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage offshore Malaysia. The 🇮🇷🛢️cargo will be transferred by Ship-to-Ship (StS) ops to another Tanker waiting in that anchorage. Then those receiving tankers will transport the 🇮🇷🛢️➡️🇨🇳, for delivery to "Teapot Refineries" which are also US-sanctioned. The 🇮🇷🛢️magically becomes 🇲🇾🛢️in the Chinese oil import statistics. All this happens on Dark Fleet tankers that sail with impunity on the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, avoiding any scrutiny and inspection. The @IMOHQ has called for action on the Dark Fleet, in particular by Coastal States, but nothing meaningful has happened to reduce the risks. The risks continue to grow. See the @UANI #GhostArmada list of illicit tankers that participate in this scheme. @JemimaShelley @mercoglianos @TankerTrackers @ed_fin

Good question. That's one of the primary reason they do the Ship-to-Ship (STS) off Malaysia. The ships that carry the 🇮🇷🛢️from Kharg Island, Iran, to the anchorage off Malaysia, are usually 🇮🇷-flagged, or falsely-flagged (and stateless) vessels that are already usually sanctioned by US OFAC. The tankers that receive the 🇮🇷🛢️are usually semi-legit ships, not usually sanctioned (yet). So when they arrive at the ports in 🇨🇳 to deliver the cargo the the "Teapot Refineries" they claim the cargo is now magically "🇲🇾🛢️" Officially, in their statistics, 🇨🇳 imports ZERO 🇮🇷🛢️ And they import more "🇲🇾🛢️" than Malaysia even produces in total. It realy is that ridiculous. China & Iran and their illicit network of Brokers and Dark Fleet owners have built a system to fully circumvent US sanctions. And Malaysia does nothing. The Coastal States in Southeast Asia do nothing. @UANI has documented all of this and publicly identifies the Dark Fleet tankers onto our #GhostArmada list, so that hopefully they get sanctioned, and also so that legit shipping companies do not ever purchase or do business with these ships. unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/stop-hop-… So, yes, there is a direct link, with evidence, to show the link between the tankers that leave Iran and the tankers that deliver sanctioned cargo to China. See also, @NUS_CIL Prof Beckman's paper on what the Coastal States can do about this Dark Fleet in Southeast Asia: brill.com/view/journals/… See also @TankerTrackers publicly available list of sanctioned vessels. This is the only free resource that shows ALL sanctions lists together in one place. tankertrackers.com/report/sanctio… Hope that answers the question.

@supbrow @mercoglianos @brentdsadler @cdrsalamander @anniekbyx Thanks, excellent info - but presumably the PRC denies all knowledge of this, no? However, if the PRC has negotiated safe passage with Iran for these ships, would that directly link them to the offshore transfers and make Beijing legally liable?

@supbrow Will it be possible to link these tankers with ship-to-ship transfers off Malaysia? If Beijing has negotiated their passage through Hormuz would that be clear evidence of official Chinese involvement in the ship-to-ship transfers?

@ed_fin @TankerTrackers 💯

Special mention to @TankerTrackers — not just because he generously shares what he is seeing, to the best of his ability, but because he is not trying to manipulate the information to fit an ideology or political agenda. (Or a long / short position in his book). 🙏🏻

It never ceases to amaze me how many Fintwit influencers who (suddenly!) have strong opinions about the Strait of Hummus are not aware of this mechanism... which may soon become a pressure point for US Treasury. Charlie lays it all out. Read carefully. And pull up a map. 🫡

@bill_hayton @mercoglianos @brentdsadler @cdrsalamander @anniekbyx

Hi @bill_hayton, The Tankers that leave the Persian Gulf after loading in Kharg and then sail to Malaysian Eastern Out of Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage ALL are sending their oil to China. Every single one. They sail with Impunity in the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, whether 🇮🇷-flagged or Falsely-flagged and Stateless. They anchor in the waters off Malaysia and meet other well known Dark Fleet Tankers in the EOPL for Ship-to-Ship (StS) transfer. They do not comply with international law or Marine Pollution (MARPOL) regulations. The receiving tanker then takes the 🇮🇷🛢️➡️🇨🇳. This happens +500 times per year. About +$45 Billion worth in 2025. And not one of the Coastal States does anything, despite the risk to their marine environment and to the safe navigation in the busy sea lanes. Some info resources: The @UANI #GhostArmada list of blacklisted tankers. See the UANI Iran War Shipping Report: unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/iran-war-… And monthly Shipping updates: unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/february-… The work by @JemimaShelley The @USCC_GOV report on China-Iran links that references @UANI data: uscc.gov/research/china… See also the great data from @TankerTrackers, who is the absolute #1 source of accurate data. Hope this answers the question and helps raise awareness on the multi-billion dollar China-link. @ed_fin @soonweilun @MarcusHand1 @OwenWalker0

@BDHerzinger @garnikis Except on Festivus.

@garnikis Yeah, I’ve spent a fair bit of time in Eastern Europe and this is a feat of strength I am uninterested in attempting.

I mean, dude is lucky that all he did was fall over and lose a tube of classified maps. I’m not even mad, I’m impressed.

"Where there's a will, there's a way.' Also, having a morality system that justifies doing business 💰💰with 🇮🇷 regime and IRGC, also helps. The invisible hand of Capitalism closed the Strait, and it also opens the Strait @mercoglianos

India getting ships through Strait of Hormuz

"Iran to Help After Attacking Thai Vessel, Three Crew Still Await Rescue" Now that is an interesting headline.

UKMTO reporting first maritime attack since March 12. Tanker struck by projectile at anchor

Red Sea naval security mission may stretch to Strait of Hormuz, EU official says EU foreign policy chief said expanding the remit of Greek-led Aspides mission is the easiest way to keep shipping moving tradewindsnews.com/tankers/red-se…