Craig Singleton

My new @nytopinion essay is out today. From my @FDD perch, I argue that Beijing’s furious overreaction to one sentence in Tokyo isn’t a sign of confidence – it’s a sign of anxiety about a closing window on #Taiwan. 👇 nytimes.com/2025/12/02/opi…

@RushDoshi Great job, @RushDoshi.

On Tuesday, I testified before the House Homeland Security Committee on China's strides in robotics and AI. I warned that we lost solar, batteries, and EVs -- now we're at risk of losing robotics and AI. If that happens, it would irreversibly change the balance of power. Five points: 1️⃣ China aims to win the next industrial revolution. PRC leaders believe history is shaped by industrial revolutions. The first, steam power, made Britain dominant. The second and third, electrification and mass manufacturing, made America dominant. China is determined to win the fourth. 2️⃣ In robotics, China is already winning. In 2024, China installed 300,000 new industrial robots. America installed 30,000. China now has over 2 million robots in its factories — five times more than the US. A decade ago, it imported 75% of its robots. Today it makes 60% domestically. This year alone, China may spend $400 billion on industrial policy. The entire US CHIPS Act provided $50 billion across multiple years. If we fall behind here, U.S. reindustrialization becomes farfetched. 3️⃣ In AI, we're ahead — but selling off the advantage. China has more energy, more talent, and makes the edge devices. But America still leads because of chips, according to China's own AI companies. US chips are 4-5x better than China's today. We are debating whether to surrender that edge. 4️⃣ We are inviting risks of cyberespionage and catastrophic cyberattacks. PRC law requires its companies to cooperate with intelligence services and never disclose it. Today's robots carry LiDAR, microphones, and cameras — they are mobile surveillance platforms. But the bigger risk is cyberattack. We know China has compromised our power, gas, water, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure in preparation for cyberattack. We cannot deploy robots in sensitive facilities from the very country targeting those facilities. 5️⃣ Here's what we must do. Extend ICTS rules to cover Chinese robots. Direct CISA to audit where they're deployed in critical infrastructure. Ban federal procurement of Chinese robotics and AI. Strengthen semiconductor export controls. Stop treating American AI companies with more regulatory scrutiny than Chinese ones. And build allied scale in robotics—a trading bloc with preferential terms for the members that can rival China's scale in in the sector. Thanks to @HomelandDemsIt and @HomelandGOP for the hearing on this topic, and grateful to join @MRobbinsAUVSI and colleagues from Scale and Boston Dynamics for a great discussion.

From @FDD's 2025 Taiwan tabletop exercises 👇 "China is preparing for a conflict it hopes never to fight — by slowly engineering the conditions for Taiwan’s total capitulation. Central to that strategy is energy coercion: the use of economic, legal, and cyber levers to throttle Taiwan’s fuel supply and fracture its political will. Rather than launch a sudden maritime blockade or kinetic invasion, Beijing is more likely to pursue a subtler campaign, one that begins with administrative actions and regulatory pressure, such as Coast Guard inspections disguised as routine maritime enforcement." Report link here: fdd.org/analysis/2025/…

On behalf of @FDD, I testified before @GOPHELP @HELPCmteDems last week on malign foreign influence in higher education. New reporting from @FreeBeacon and @EdWorkforceCmte underscores the concern: foreign governments like Qatar and China don’t just fund universities—they can seek to shape messaging and outcomes. My testimony here: fdd.org/analysis/2026/…

If China is the most capable AI competitor, the answer isn’t to fuel it. Advanced chips like #Nvidia’s #H200 should power U.S. innovation, not accelerate Beijing’s.

2025 @FDD report: Power Under Pressure: The Fight to Protect Taiwan’s Energy Lifelines from Beijing’s Aggression 👇 fdd.org/analysis/2025/…

Prolonging the war with Iran could strengthen China’s hand But a short, decisive campaign could cause Beijing to think twice about taking Taiwan. @CraigMSingleton in @washingtonpost: washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/… bit.ly/4bgY2X5

China isn’t rushing to defend Iran. It’s playing the long game from the superpower sidelines. My latest in @washingtonpost on what Beijing is learning—and why it matters for what comes next. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/…

Trump’s comment should be read primarily as leverage ahead of the planned Xi summit rather than a signal that the meeting is likely to be canceled. By linking the summit to China’s role in stabilizing energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, he is reframing the crisis as a question of burden sharing. China is the largest buyer of Gulf oil and a major beneficiary of open sea lanes, yet it has historically avoided taking responsibility for securing them. The message to Beijing is that countries that rely most heavily on Hormuz have an interest in preventing disruption. The remark also reflects how central the Strait has become to the overall strategic picture. Whoever can threaten or secure that chokepoint has enormous leverage over energy markets. That reality likely explains why Washington is signaling that it cannot manage the problem alone and expects major energy consumers, including China, to play a role in preventing further disruption. This puts Beijing in a difficult position. China is unlikely to publicly pressure Tehran, but it may use quiet diplomacy to discourage further escalation while continuing to call for de-escalation. The summit itself remains strategically valuable to both sides, so the threat of delay should be understood as negotiating leverage rather than a likely outcome.

Iranian oil shipments to China continue for a reason. With a Xi-Trump summit approaching, Washington has incentives to avoid steps that would directly pressure Chinese energy imports. Strategic stability with Beijing is clearly a priority right now.

Smart move by @RepPatHarrigan . Taiwan imports nearly all its energy, and LNG supply is one of the island’s most sensitive strategic vulnerabilities. @FDD has been warning for years that energy coercion could become Beijing’s pressure point in a crisis. Strong leadership to address it. Our report: fdd.org/events/2025/11…

Senior director of FDD's China Program @CraigMSingleton testifies before @GOPHELP, @HELPCmteDems on foreign influence in American higher education. Watch his opening statement 👇

U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy today on autonomous vehicles: “I want the technology to be developed in America. I want the rest of the world to use American technology. I don’t want to see a foreign competitor/foreign adversary/communist party beat America. This is a national security issue, an economic issue and a safety issue.”

Academics, researchers, and university staff | @ChinaSelect wants to hear from you🫵 If you have information regarding: 🇨🇳Undisclosed foreign funding 💱Financial conflicts of interest 📚Research partnerships specifically involving entities tied to China Submit information confidentially through our whistleblower portal, and put “Research Security” in the subject line of your email. chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/contact/whistl…

Happening tomorrow @ 10:00AM ET | @CraigMSingleton testifies before @GOPHELP. Watch here: help.senate.gov/hearings/trans…

Republican proposes bill to bolster Taiwan's energy security against China @FDD team recently ran wargames in Taiwan to draw attention to this critical vulnerability. washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy-…

Beijing doesn't need to fire a single shot to cripple Taiwan, they just need to cut the power. Today I introduced a bill that strips them of that option by redirecting U.S. LNG exports, protecting shipping lanes with federal war risk insurance, and standing up a U.S.-Taiwan Energy Security Center. If deterrence means anything, it starts with hardening the points our adversaries count on. washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy-…

Important move by @repmoolenar, @RepBrianMast, @RepWalberg and @ChinaSelect. Chinese Student and Scholars Associations receive funding and direction from the #CCP. @FDD has warned about this ed risk for years. Foreign mission status-and more transparency via FARA-are overdue.

U.S. lawmakers are taking action to protect American campuses from foreign influence. Chairmen @RepMoolenaar, @RepBrianMast, and @RepWalberg called on @StateDept @SecRubio to designate the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) as a foreign mission of China, ensuring advance notice of meetings with universities and local governments, and approval for public events. The CCP is using front organizations like CSSA to extend its influence in the U.S., and we need transparency and oversight of their activities. 📄 Read the full letter ⬇️ chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-re…

The People’s Liberation Army is already dissecting today’s operational lessons, too, including how U.S. and allied forces are integrating electronic warfare, neutralizing air defenses, and coordinating precision strikes. PLA strategists believe Iran’s greatest vulnerability proved to be the “enemy within”—failures of internal security and intelligence. Others warn that Tehran’s most costly mistake was placing “blind faith in peace” while its adversaries prepared for war. These retrospectives will feed directly into Beijing’s own contingency planning, particularly scenarios closer to home involving Taiwan.

Spot on. Nothing suggests Washington’s Iran campaign is intentionally aimed at containing or countering China, even if the downstream effects could undercut China’s interests. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth underscored as much, noting that neither China nor Russia factored into Washington’s operational calculus in Iran. But, great powers rarely experience events in isolation. Beijing will interpret recent developments through its own strategic lens, likely seeing them as further confirmation that while the American military is formidable, the U.S. is a volatile, declining power that too often resorts to abrupt, unilateral force.